Heresies of sea power (1906) (14779958924)
Summary
Identifier: heresiesofseapow00jane (find matches)
Title: Heresies of sea power
Year: 1906 (1900s)
Authors: Jane, Fred T. (Frederick Thomas), 1865-1916
Subjects: Sea-power Naval history War
Publisher: London, New York and Bombay : Longmans, Green, and co.
Contributing Library: University of California Libraries
Digitizing Sponsor: MSN
Text Appearing Before Image:
tov koXvavriKto re a/uo £tt\ irKtov Ttov &\\tov Icrxvffas, ryv (TTpartiav ov \dpiTi rb ir\elovf) <p63to ^vvayayivv iroiT)ffa<r6ai) (Thucydides, I. 9). The gist of this is thathe owed his position to his hereditary power and to his naval powermore than to anything else. The second passage points out that inearly Greece the only important wars were maritime (Thucydides, I.15).
Text Appearing After Image:
l-l Q *tH<5Otsi M « o M .J5 o» o *-« H 03H> DO1 s O o►j w 0< 28 HEEESIES OF SEA POWER Of sea tactics, few, if any, ideas seem to have pre-vailed before the Peloponnesian war. Salamis wasnot characterised by anything that could be dignifiedwith the name of tactics as we understand them ; insubstance it was a land battle fought on shipboard.Incidentally as ship crashed into ship, there may havebeen born then ideas as to concerted tactical action withramming as the objective, but these ideas bore no fruittill the Peloponnesian war. Cutting the line existed as a battle object, just asindiscriminate ramming existed ; but in both cases onlybecause such things were the nearest analogy to landwarfare. At the same time tactical ideas were evidentlybeing evolved, and in the Athenian navy concertedaction—the first necessity of tactics—was fully recog-nised. In a battle between the Corinthians andCorcyreans which preceded the great war, the Atheni
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